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IS IT TIME TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION? 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION 
JAMES E. FLEMING* 
INTRODUCTION 
Is it time to rewrite the Constitution? We should break this question 
down into two parts: (1) Is it time to rewrite the Constitution by adopting 
particular amendments?, and (2) Is it time to throw out the Constitution 
and write a new one through holding a constitutional convention, as 
Sandy Levinson has urged?1 
A further question is to what extent does the Constitution, and our 
constitutional practice under it, already permit or require “rewriting” as 
we build out our framework of constitutional self-government over time? 
Despite claims by some originalists that the formal amending procedures 
of Article V are the exclusive legitimate means for changing the 
Constitution, living constitutionalists like David Strauss and Bruce 
Ackerman have gone so far as to argue that formal constitutional 
amendments are largely irrelevant to such change. Strauss argues that 
common law constitutional interpretation, not amendment through the 
formal procedures of Article V, has been our primary means for 
constitutional change.2 Ackerman argues that the six-phase higher 
lawmaking procedures outside Article V that he elaborates have been the 
primary means whereby We the People have “hammered out” such 
changes.3 To the extent that living constitutionalists like Strauss and 
Ackerman are right, perhaps we do not need formally to rewrite the 
Constitution to realize constitutional change. Perhaps we already do well 
enough through “rewriting” it informally. 
For that very reason, conservatives and libertarians like Richard 
Epstein have bemoaned that progressives already have “rewritten” the 
Constitution, expanding governmental powers and eviscerating economic 
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liberties.4 Similarly, conservative originalists like Robert Bork and 
Antonin Scalia have complained that liberals already have “rewritten” 
the Constitution, reading “unenumerated” personal liberties into it.5 And 
libertarian originalists like Randy Barnett have called for “restoring the 
lost Constitution” by undoing the progressive and liberal “redactions.”6 
This Essay is part of my book in progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect 
Constitution,7 in which I reject all forms of originalism and recast the 
best forms of living constitutionalism. Instead, I defend what Ronald 
Dworkin has called a “moral reading” of the American Constitution8 and 
what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to 
constitutional interpretation.9 By “moral reading” and “philosophic 
approach,” I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying 
abstract moral and political principles, not codifying concrete historical 
rules or practices, and of interpretation of those principles as requiring 
normative judgments about how they are best understood, not merely 
historical research to discover relatively specific original meanings. I 
argue that the moral reading, not any version of originalism or living 
constitutionalism, is the most faithful to the Constitution’s commitments. 
In my book, Securing Constitutional Democracy, I characterize my 
approach as a “Constitution-perfecting theory” (my term) under which 
we should interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be 
(Dworkin’s formulation).10 That is not to say that we should interpret it 
as a perfect Constitution. Rather, whatever imperfections our 
Constitution and our constitutional practice under it may have, we should 
interpret it in its best light. Constitution-perfecting approaches like 
Dworkin’s and mine, while not interpreting the Constitution to make it 
perfect, nonetheless mitigate some of its imperfections by aiming for 
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Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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AUTONOMY (2006). 
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what Levinson has called “happy endings.”11 Furthermore, we adopt and 
strive to maintain an attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution. 
Proponents of views like Dworkin’s and mine may be less ready 
than some others to argue that we should rewrite the Constitution as a 
whole—to throw out the Constitution and adopt a new one. This 
notwithstanding the fact that we recognize many imperfections in our 
Constitution and constitutional practice. We also may be less likely than 
some others to argue for adopting a number of specific constitutional 
amendments. 
But even under a Constitution-perfecting theory, and even with an 
attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, we might conclude that 
it is time to rewrite the Constitution in certain circumstances. And so, let 
us return to the opening question: Is it time to rewrite the Constitution? 
The answer depends upon our judgments concerning: (1) whether the 
Constitution has failed, (2) whether it has contributed to incorrigible 
breakdown or dysfunction, (3) whether it is irredeemably undemocratic 
or unjust, and (4) whether the prospects for reform and improvement 
through rewriting the Constitution are good. In my fuller paper, which 
will be a chapter in my book, I address such issues. 
I. STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 
In confronting (real or arguable) constitutional failure, dysfunction, 
democratic deficits, and injustice, we need strategies for responding to 
imperfection (to recall the title of a book edited by Levinson).12 These 
strategies may include convening a constitutional convention or adopting 
specific formal constitutional amendments through the procedures of 
Article V. But, I argue for less formal strategies: (1) developing informal 
constitutional amendments over time (e.g., through Strauss-style 
common law constitutional interpretation or Ackerman-style higher 
lawmaking outside the procedures of Article V); (2) interpreting the 
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be (Dworkin’s moral reading) 
or to redeem its promises (Balkin’s living originalism); and (3) working 
around imperfections through what I have called “successful failures,” 
whereby the features of a Constitution fail to work as contemplated or 
designed, but we comprehend that that failure turns out to be a good 
thing. 
Under these strategies for responding to imperfection, we adopt and 
strive to maintain an attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution. We 
 
 11. See Colloquy, Fidelity as Integrity, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1997) 
(statement of Sanford Levinson). 
 12. RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed.,1995). 
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conceive the Constitution as a framework of general powers and abstract 
rights, as an instrument for pursuing the ends proclaimed in the 
preamble, as an instrument for redeeming its promises. (Here I 
deliberately echo and invoke the work of Barber and Balkin.) We 
approach the Constitution as an “experiment” in constitutional 
self-government, a scheme to be built out (Balkin) or hammered out 
(Ackerman) over time, not a fully finished structure to begin with. We 
appreciate that the building is never complete—that the Constitution 
“will always be building,” as Charles Black put it.13 
As discussed above, Levinson’s response to dysfunction and the 
democratic deficit (as he sees it) is to call for rewriting the Constitution 
through holding a constitutional convention.14 My response to such 
imperfections—beyond arguing for applying a Constitution-perfecting 
theory, with an attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution—is to 
call for “rewriting” the constitutional culture, as it were. For a muscular 
argument along these lines, read Barber’s important and provocative new 
book, Constitutional Failure.15 Barber goes so far as to argue that the 
Constitution has failed—or is in danger of failing—not because of the 
institutional failure that Levinson and others have lamented, but because 
of “attitudinal” failure.16 Barber forcefully argues that Madison’s strategy 
of supplying the defects of better motives through checks and balances 
and relying upon private incentives—rather than through cultivating the 
virtues and attitudes in citizens that are necessary for successful 
constitutional self-government—has failed.17 I have addressed such 
matters in my book with Linda McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, 
Responsibilities, and Virtues.18 There we argue for a “mild 
perfectionism,” a formative project of inculcating civic virtues and 
cultivating the capacities required for constitutional self-government.19 
Like Barber, I would argue that it is in virtues, attitudes, and capacities, 
not in the “hard-wired features” of the Constitution as such, where the 
greatest failures of our constitutional order lie. Barber cites our book as 
among those sources offering some hope for American constitutionalism 
 
 13. Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in 1 
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT 337, 343 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). 
 14. See LEVINSON, supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 15. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (2014). 
 16. Id. at 24. 
 17. BARBER, supra note 15.  
 18. JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013). 
 19. Id. 
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(despite what he sees all around as the evidence of constitutional 
failure).20 
Here I would make two further points. One, we may not be able to 
rewrite the Constitution successfully without “rewriting” the 
constitutional culture to begin with—otherwise, good proposals most 
likely would fail to be made or even if made, would fail to be adopted. 
Second, once we “rewrite” our constitutional culture—so as more 
effectively to inculcate the civic virtues and capacities necessary for 
successful constitutional self-government—we may not need to rewrite 
the Constitution, whether by specific amendments or a constitutional 
convention. Instead, applying a Constitution-perfecting theory, with an 
attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, we might be able to do 
well enough by interpreting the Constitution we have so as to make it the 
best it can be. 
At the same time, if we take the view that “the preeminent 
constitutional virtue is not fidelity to a given constitution but the moral 
and intellectual capacity to make and reform constitutions”—as Barber, 
invoking Murphy, has argued in Constitutional Failure21—we might 
more readily conclude that we should rewrite the Constitution. Or at any 
rate that we should “rewrite” the constitutional culture in order to 
cultivate liberal virtues (as Stephen Macedo has argued)22 and foster the 
capacities for constitutional self-government (as McClain and I have 
argued).23 These virtues and capacities may be necessary to “supply the 
defect of better motives”—contrary to Madison’s strategy of checks and 
balances and private incentives—if we are to attain or maintain a 
Constitution that would be worthy of our fidelity. 
 
 
 20. BARBER, supra note 15, at 142 & n.51 (citing FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra 
note 18, at 4–11, 54–68, 87–91. 113–21). 
 21. Id. at 111 & n.1 (citing WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: 
CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 15–16 (2007)). 
 22. STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A 
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, 
VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); 
 23. See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 18. 
